



Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment¹

Introduction

The developing countries are frustrated with the way the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT), has been working — largely to the benefit of the industrially developed countries and detrimental to the interests of their developing counterparts. Nevertheless, even with their weak and often vulnerable economies and lack of negotiating and implementing capacity, the developing countries have been making serious efforts and commitments for the success of this organisation since its inception in 1947.

As Wilkinson and Scott (2008) note two broad interpretations currently prevail in the literature on developing country participation in the GATT. First, it is believed that developing countries spent most of their time at the GATT negotiations in relieving themselves of various commitments while focusing on the pursuit of industrialisation through import substitution and/or free-riding on the commitments made by their industrial country counterparts. The other interpretation suggests that developing countries spent much of their time in the GATT either as ‘quiet bystanders’, lacking the expertise or political representation to participate fully, or else attempting to redress biases in the institution’s design. Wilkinson and Scott are of the opinion that neither of these two interpretations offers a sufficiently accurate account of the role of developing countries in the GATT.

This briefing paper will begin with an overview of the role of developing countries in the evolution of GATT, i.e. in framing its charter and rules etc. It will be argued that while developing countries were able to ensure that the GATT did create some provisions that advanced their interests, this did not extend to real market access for agricultural and textile products of export interest to them. Furthermore, the provision of special and differential treatment (S&DT) made to address their special development situations was significantly eroded by the Uruguay Round. Even the provisions that were included in the GATT to provide

technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries were only of a best endeavour nature, and largely ineffective.

The GATT and the Role of Developing Countries

The developing countries played an active role in GATT from the institution’s inception. There are two academic perspectives on this issue. The first one attributes the lack of developing country success in advancing their market access interests to exaggerated focus on S&DT. The second perspective ascribes this to a lack of technical capacity and experience.

Elaborating on the first perspective, Srinivasan (1998) argues that developing countries “in their relentless but misguided pursuit of the import-substitution strategy of development, in effect opted out of the GATT”. He claims that they were ‘ambivalent toward the GATT and, until the Tokyo round, did not participate actively in it’.² Moreover, they demanded and received a ‘permanent status of inferiority’ through seeking S&DT, which limited the benefits they could receive from the Agreement. Hoekman and Kostechi (2001) argued that although “the rationale for the S&DT was based on prevalent theories that import substitution was a necessary element in effective development strategies, and that the GATT was for a long time “a club that was primarily of relevance to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries”, developing countries nevertheless opted not to participate fully in the GATT— a decision that precluded developing countries from getting their interests placed on the agenda of the GATT.

The second perspective portrays developing countries as a group that spent their time in the GATT either as ‘quiet bystanders’ lacking the expertise or political representation to participate fully, or else as contracting parties attempting to redress biases in the institution’s design. The developing countries acted in this way simply because they found the institution to be ‘unfriendly’ and ‘not a fruitful one’ for promoting their interests. Many developing countries were unable to maintain official representation in Geneva (Diana

Tussie and Miguel Lengyel, 2002). There are several arguments put forth on as to why the developing countries chose not to participate in the GATT which, *inter alia*, include: a distrust of GATT rules; a perception that the GATT was a 'poor substitute' for the more development friendly but ultimately unrealised International Trade Organisation (ITO); a decision making system that, despite the nod to one-member-one-vote and a pursuit of decision by consensus, crowded out developing countries and gave rise to a range of untoward activities designed to generate consent (Jawara and Kwa, 2003); the use of bilateral negotiations between the two main suppliers of a good (the so-called principal supplier rule) as the basis for negotiations; and the deliberate stacking of the agenda with issues of benefit only to the industrial states (Narlikar, 2004). Indeed, Paul Collier (2006) sees the 'success' of the GATT as resulting, in part, from the way in which developing countries were excluded from the institution. He also says that the GATT was not a global institution; it was basically a marketplace for OECD countries to strike deals for reciprocal trade liberalisation.

Developing Countries Participation in the GATT: An Alternative View

Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott (2008) and Faizel Ismail (2007), however, have argued that the developing countries have always been active in GATT/WTO negotiations/deliberations and have tried to adjust the shape of the General Agreement so that it better reflects their interests as well as those of the industrialised countries. However, the efforts of developing country delegations were often 'given short shrift' (Patterson, 1966). The developing countries played an active role in GATT negotiations by providing chairs and vice-chairs for various trade negotiation committees ahead of the United Nations Havana Conference on Trade and Employment (1947-48) and even after the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

Despite being handicapped on several counts (such as in their technical expertise, personnel, finance, and influence), developing countries have always played an active role in every event of the GATT. As the GATT developed through time, its membership grew. In the early years, a good deal of this growth came from the industrial states. Out of 23 original contracting parties of ITO/GATT in 1945-47, as many as 14 were from the industrialised world. By the late 1950s, however, the lion's share of the growth in membership came from newly independent countries seeking to assert and cement their political independence by signing up to major international treaties and organisations. Before the establishment of WTO in 1995 as many as 128 countries were already members of the WTO. Thereafter 25 more countries, including China, obtained the membership of the WTO.

The relative delay in the accession of developing countries to the GATT had a number of important consequences.

The GATT had always been an instrument for pursuing the trade (and related) objectives of the leading industrial states like the US and the Western Europe. By the time most of the developing countries joined, the GATT's character had been refined so that it took little account of the needs of developing countries. The GATT was, as opined by Robert Hudec (1990), the 'property of the industrial countries' and they did not have to accommodate the rest of the world; it provided 'a place where the leading countries could go off to do business by themselves'. Post-war liberalisation, much to the irritation of the developing countries, saw the exclusion of agriculture from the GATT agenda and provision of protection to the textiles and clothing (T&C) industries of the developed world.

The Evolution of Development Provisions in GATT/WTO

Much of the discussion concerning the creation of GATT took place in the meetings dealing with the ITO Charter rather than in the meetings on the General Agreement itself. As a result, disputes arising over the nature of the trading system occurred mainly in the ITO negotiations. Thus, in the GATT negotiations developing countries appeared to be relatively more peripheral than was actually the case.

This was true, for instance, in the case of the demand from industrialised countries that reciprocity be a core principle of tariff negotiations. In the ITO negotiations, the principle's inclusion led to a large amount of discussion, with developing countries (in particular, India, Cuba, and Chile) arguing that their bargaining power was insufficient to enable them to extract concessions of value from other countries on a reciprocal basis (Evans 1968). By contrast, because the principle's inclusion had been debated at length in the ITO meetings, it was included in the GATT without comment.

At its inception in 1947, the newly formed GATT did not recognise the special situation of developing countries. The fundamental principle of the Agreement, referred to as the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN)³ treatment and provided for in Article I of the GATT, was that rights and obligations should apply uniformly to all contracting parties. However, the GATT did incorporate a number of exceptions to its general principles of MFN and national treatment⁴, through the so-called S&DT provisions. That said, these provisions were considered to be largely ineffective. The WTO and the GATT before it have thus been criticised by developing countries and civil society groups as being unfair, unbalanced, and prejudicial to the interests of developing countries.⁵ By the time the Doha Round (2001) was instituted, developing countries had succeeded in obtaining as part of the mandate of the round the need to make these S&DT provisions, "precise, effective, and operational"⁶.

As argued above, the focus on S&DT as the main development concept has distracted the developing

countries from their core development needs in the multilateral trading system. These core development needs have been argued to be: fair trade; capacity building; balanced rules and good governance. Developing countries have nevertheless used the GATT/WTO process to some extent to gain additional policy space in the multilateral trading system through amendments or the introduction of new rules and laws that recognise these needs:

1. An important example of developing country participation in ITO negotiations is provided by the Brazilian proposal for expansion of world trade and employment in the first meeting of the UN Preparatory Committee on Trade and Employment in 1947. There were many similarities between the Brazilian charter and the charter submitted by the US (both charters were, for instance, based on the principle of MFN, though in the Brazilian case this was to be granted unconditionally only by countries in advanced stages of development, and both banned the use of quantitative restrictions with some exceptions based on balance of payments crises etc.) as well as some notable differences. The US charter, for instance contained a broad exemption from the ban on quantitative restrictions for 'any agricultural product imported in any form, necessary for the enforcement of governmental measures of certain kinds'. The Brazilian proposal, in contrast, included recognition of the problems faced by less developed countries as well as provisions needed to mete out special treatment to those countries to help them with their development drives.

Although the Brazilian proposal lost out to its American counterpart (indeed, it was never in the running), Brazil and other developing countries nevertheless sought to exercise an influence in the ITO's construction. For instance, in the discussions about the method of decision making to be employed in the ITO the developing countries were vociferous in their resistance to a system of weighted voting, as they feared that such a system would institutionalise their secondary status. Indeed, it was precisely because developing countries were so engaged, among other reasons, that the organisation that emerged from the negotiations failed to represent US interests and that the US chose not to ratify the Havana Charter, deciding to persevere with the GATT instead. As John Evans (1968) noted, 32 developing countries used their greater numerical presence to insist 'on, and obtain ... many changes in the Geneva draft of the Charter'⁷.

In the end, the negotiations saw the ITO Charter altered in ways that reduced its usefulness to the industrial states and its lead architect, the US in particular. The result was the stillbirth of the organisation. The stillbirth of the ITO did not, however, put an end to post-war efforts to liberalise trade. Frustrations at the pace of negotiations had emerged long before the Havana Conference and the members of the Preparatory Committee⁸ (established in February 1946 to discuss the creation of the ITO)

shared a view that it was important to concur on the fundamental principles of the Charter in order to give contractual force to the tariff concessions already negotiated. The result was the negotiation and subsequent adoption of the GATT.

2. At the review session of the GATT (1954-55), Article XVIII of GATT was revised to provide developing countries additional flexibility with regard to their obligations. This article, which was now titled "Government Assistance to Economic Development", created a number of significant new provisions. Section A enabled developing contracting parties to modify or withdraw scheduled tariff concessions in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry. Section B recognised the long term nature of developing country balance-of-payments problems and provided them with additional flexibility for the use of quantitative restrictions. Section C enabled developing countries, subject to certain conditions, to use any measure not consistent with other provisions of GATT to promote a particular industry.
3. The Haberler Report⁹ found that there was some substance in the feeling of disquiet among primary producing countries that the present rules and conventions relating to commercial policies were relatively unfavourable to them. As a result, the contracting parties adopted a *Declaration on the Promotion of Trade of Less Developed Countries* in December 1961. The Declaration also called for a "sympathetic attitude" to the question of reciprocity by developing countries. Finally, the Declaration called for more attention to be given to programmes of technical assistance from developed countries to developing countries for improvement in production and marketing methods, and the expansion of trade among developing countries themselves.
4. Developing countries opposed the reciprocity rule from the very beginning on the basis of asymmetric development levels of contracting parties and their limited production capacity. Eventually they succeeded in its removal (with the introduction in 1965 of Part IV of the GATT); however, this actually had the effect of further isolating developing countries from discussions over the shape and direction of negotiations (Srinivasan, 1998).

The failure to provide benefits in the area of agriculture contributed to growing recognition among contracting parties (particularly the developing countries) that conducting negotiations on a commodity by commodity and country by country basis was no longer adequate and future tariff rounds required instead the adoption of new techniques, in particular, some form of linear tariff reduction. Concerted action by developing countries aiming to make trade an integral part of development was, however, thwarted at a special

session in Geneva in November 1964 when contracting parties drew up a protocol amending the GATT by introducing a fourth section (known as Part IV which formally came into operation in 1966) dealing with trade and development. The developed countries, thus, successfully averted possible emergence of alternative trade machinery in the form of UNCTAD. Part IV was not, however, the panacea the developing countries had hoped for, as Srinivasan (1998) pointed out that, “under Part IV the less developed countries achieved little by way of precise commitments...but a lot in terms of verbiage¹⁰. The introduction of Part IV to the GATT did, however, open up the possibility of creating preferential trading systems that favoured developing countries. This led to the subsequent creation of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) granting preferential tariff rates to exports from developing countries into the markets of the industrialised countries.

5. Pressures from developing countries in the Tokyo Round led to both the GSP and the inter-developing country preference system being given a legal footing through the Enabling Clause, and the requirement for a specific waiver from MFN obligations being done away with. This act finally introduced the right of developing countries to grant one another preferential tariff rates to the GATT – a privilege that they had fought doggedly (and successfully) for in the ITO negotiations but which had been left out of the GATT in 1947.

The Tokyo Round expanded the agenda away from purely tariff issues to address the growing incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), an issue which had been examined in the Kennedy round but with very limited success. Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) were considered to be the most significant threat to the prospects of developing countries increasing their exports of semi-industrial and industrial products. By the time of the Tokyo round there were between 800 and 850 different NTBs in force. There was very little progress in this area as industrialised countries had made the extension of the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) a precondition for any reduction of tariffs on textiles. Safeguards were another very important NTB issue for developing countries. The negotiations broke down over this issue because of the refusal of developing countries to accept the European Economic Community’s (EEC) demand that each member should have the right to impose unilateral safeguards on individual countries without multilateral approval. The Tokyo Round was of limited significance to many developing countries and for many others it may have even been detrimental¹¹.

6. The weak results of many of the Tokyo codes and failure once again to evolve any consensus on agriculture set the stage for another round of negotiation and consequently the laying of the foundations of the

Uruguay Round (UR). The US proposal to include services, intellectual property and investment into the new round was met with vehement opposition from developing countries led by India and Brazil. Realising that previous rounds had done little for their interests, these countries wanted action to be undertaken outside of a traditional round. They pushed for action promoting the growth of GATT-inconsistent restrictions such as VERs, the MFA etc. in agriculture and argued that the developed country fulfilment of earlier commitments to reduce trade barriers affecting the exports of developing countries was a higher priority than launching a new set of negotiations.

It was because of the stiff opposition of developing countries to the expansion of the GATT that the November 1982 ministerial meeting collapsed, though the differences between the US and the EEC also played role in this. But, by the 1985 General Council meeting all industrial countries were in favour of a new round, as were, to varying degrees, a number of developing countries. That said, a group of 24 developing countries¹² remained firmly opposed to the expanded agenda. However, under the threat of a US walkout, the group of ten developing countries eventually caved in, after agreeing that the new issues would proceed on a separate track to that for the negotiations on goods.

The picture that emerges is, once again, of developing countries making a significant input to the proceedings leading to the launching of the Uruguay Round and consistently pushing forward their interests through the process. The process illustrates the degree to which developing countries were active in GATT proceedings, and the way in which those interests were largely ignored. The UR, which came into force in 1995, took a few significant steps in the direction of integrating trade in agriculture and in T&C into the multilateral trading system. Developed countries, in exchange were required to accept as a single undertaking all three major agreements which constituted the WTO Agreement; namely, the GATT; the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).

In the area of goods, the plurilateral non-tariff measure agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round became part of the WTO agreement. S&DT provisions are contained in the WTO Agreements and can be categorised into five main groups: provisions requiring WTO members to safeguard the interests of developing countries; provisions allowing flexibility to developing countries in following rules and disciplines governing trade measures; provisions allowing longer transitional periods to developing countries; and provisions for technical assistance.

Assessment

While several GATT provisions attempted to address the special situation of developing countries, these provisions were largely negated by the persistent increases in protection in developed countries against products of interest to developing countries. In addition, these development provisions were increasingly eroded in the latter GATT Rounds, particularly the UR. Pertinent examples of these trends are as follows:¹³

1. Though a number of positive provisions in favour of developing countries were included in the GATT Framework during the period 1955 to 1979, there was a steady increase in the protection and support for temperate zone agricultural products in industrialised countries. In agriculture, protection levels in developed countries remained extremely high, thus posing a barrier to developing country exports. High levels of export and domestic support subsidies in developed countries continued to distort global agricultural prices and trade. Even in the area of textile and clothing, the agreement reached in the UR to eliminate quotas was backloaded to the end of the phase out in 2005, reducing its commercial significance for developing countries.
2. Even after 13 years of existence of the WTO and six Ministerial Conferences during that period there have been no breakthroughs in areas of interest for developing countries such as “special safeguard mechanisms” (SSMs) which protect the domestic producers from harmful impacts of liberalised/free trade in these products. After the failure of the July (2008) Geneva talks, an attempt was made in mid-September 2008 to resolve the issue. The seven economic powerhouses – Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the US collectively known as the G-7 – again failed to arrive at a consensus not only on SSMs but on such other issues like cotton, tariff simplification, sensitive products, new tariff rate quota (TRQ), blue box head room and the green box of non-trade distorting subsidies.
3. By the time of the UR there was a significant shift in the nature of S&DT for developing countries. The ‘single undertaking’ required that they had to accept all the agreements reached in the round even if they did not participate in the negotiations on all of them. Thus, the concept of non-reciprocity became restricted to longer implementation periods and lower tariff reductions.
4. The trade related technical assistance (TRTA) needs of developing countries were explicitly recognised by the GATT contracting parties as early as 1961, encouraging developed countries to address the production and marketing needs of developing countries in their technical assistance programmes. These measures were largely of a best endeavour nature in that they did not impose mandatory obligations on the industrialised countries, but instead encouraged implementation of these provisions¹⁴.

The WTO’s TRTA has focused on its core competencies, namely promoting better understanding and interpretation

of WTO agreements, rules and disciplines as well as monitoring and enforcement. In recent years, the range of TRTA activities has expanded to include initiatives to build capacity of the developing countries in formulating national trade policies and participating effectively in multilateral negotiations for shaping international trade rules.

Despite this evolution and expansion of WTO provided TRTA activities, in-house capacities to understand and respond to the implications of WTO agreements and negotiate national interests and priorities are mostly inadequate in many developing and least developed countries (LDCs). Among others, the WTO’s neutrality mandate, the lack of involvement of non-WTO resource persons (other than some economists, law experts working in research institutes, universities, non-governmental organisations etc.) and lack of dynamic leadership, in particular, have been important factors in diluting the impact of the WTO provided TRTA. Consequently, there have been calls from beneficiary countries for a reorientation and rationalisation of the WTO’s TRTA activities.

Conclusion

The discussion above clearly indicates that while developing countries did play an active role in previous trade rounds in the GATT and WTO and succeed in advancing many development oriented provisions, these efforts fell short of the high level of organisation and competence that they have begun to play at the Doha Round. Since the 5th WTO Ministerial Meeting held at Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, the G-20 alliance of developing countries has become a formidable and well known coalition in the WTO Doha round negotiations. The NAMA-11 group of developing countries, which was formed at the 6th WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, is less well known. However, after the Hong Kong Ministerial the NAMA-11 has become a significant group in the Doha round negotiations on industrial tariffs, and has played a role similar to that played by the G-20 in the Doha Round agriculture negotiations. Other developing country groups have also played an increasingly assertive role in the WTO Doha round including the LDCs, the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries and the Africa Group. These groups have together become known as the G-90 group of developing countries. The G-33 group of developing countries, representing countries with predominantly small firms, and concerned to protect their rural sector, livelihood, and food security needs was formed on the eve of the Cancun Ministerial¹⁵.

The relationship between trade and development is primarily economic, but derivation of benefits from this relationship, has, of late become more political, both under multilateral and bilateral pursuits. The importance of trade for development is now universally recognised but the multilateral trading system still needs to work hard to overcome developing country suspicion on a number of issues, especially developed country refusal to address

some key issues central to poor country concerns such as the dogged continuation of agricultural support and subsidies. Such issues will remain in what we call the political ‘too hard box’ in the foreseeable future, especially for the US and Europe. In such a context, the multilateral trade system, in general, and the WTO, in particular needs to look at other activities to win support from the poorer countries and offer them meaningful support that not only assists them with key elements of their development strategies (especially trade liberalisation) but also convinces them of the utility and legitimacy of the WTO. It may be a

cliché but the WTO still needs to find a greater role for developing countries as stakeholders in the institution¹⁶.

It is for these reasons that the Doha Round has to deliver on the development promises made at its launch in Doha, almost eight years ago. This time developing countries are organised and technically competent and can negotiate. The development dimension of the WTO and the legitimacy of the multilateral trading system must be built on fair trade, balanced rules, capacity building and good governance.

References

- Bhagwati, Jagdish (2005), “Reshaping the WTO”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 168 (2): 25-30
- Collier, Paul (2006), “Why the WTO is Deadlocked and what can be done about It”, *The World Economy*, 29 (10): 1423-1449
- Evans, John W (1968), “The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade”, *International Organisation*, 22 (1): 72-98
- Faizel Ismail (2007), “Mainstreaming Development in the WTO: Developing Countries in the Doha Round” *CUTS International*
- Hoekman, Bernard and Kostecki, Michel (2001), “The Political Economy of the World Trading System”, 2nd eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Hudec, Robert E (1990), “The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy”, 2nd edn. Salem, MA, Butterworth Legal Publishers.
- Jawara, Fatoumata and Aileen Kwa (2003), “Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations”, London, Zed books
- Narlikar, Amrita (2004), “Developing Countries and the WTO” in Brain Hocking and Steven McGuire (eds), *Trade Politics*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge
- Patterson, Gardner (1966), “Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues”, 1945-1965, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2007), “Making Globalization Work”, New York, London: W.W.Norton
- Tussie, Diana and Lengyel, Michael F. (2002), “Developing Countries: Turning Participation into Influence” in Bernard Hoekman, Aditya Mattoo, and Philip English (eds), *Development, Trade and the WTO*, Washington, DC: The World Bank
- Wilkinson, Rorden and James Scott (2008), “Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment”, *World Trade Review*, 7:3, 473-510

Endnotes

- 1 This briefing paper is a synthesis of the following two papers: Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott (2008), “Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment”, *World Trade Review*, 7:3, 473-510; and Faizel Ismail (2007), “Mainstreaming Development in the WTO: Developing Countries in the Doha Round”, *CUTS International*.
- 2 Srinivasan, T.N. (1998), “Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From the GATT to the Uruguay Round and the Future”, Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview.
- 3 Article 1 of GATT 1947 provides that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties”. This rule prohibits members from discriminating against imports according to their source.
- 4 Article III.i of GATT 1947 provides: “The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amount or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production”. This national treatment provision requires members to accord non-discriminatory treatment to imports vis-à-vis domestic products once they have passed through customs.
- 5 Stiglitz, J (2002), “Globalization and its Discontents”, W W Norton and Company, USA.
- 6

- 6 See WTO Doc. Ministerial Declaration. Adopted on 14th November 2001. WT/MIN (10)/DEC/1 20th November 2001: Paragraph 12 and 44
- 7 Evans, John W (1968), "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade", International Organization, 22 (1): 72-98
- 8 19 countries were originally appointed to the Preparatory Committee: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the US, the USSR, and the UK. The USSR, however, decided not to attend the meetings
- 9 The 1958 Report on *Trends in International Trade* (Chairman, *Gottfried Haberler*), although recording the fact that no evidence of a general tendency towards specific discrimination in trading relations against the developing countries was found, documented factors that did exist and were detrimental to the terms of trade of less developed countries. In particular, it suggested that the high incidence of trade barriers faced by these countries, coupled with unfavourable price trends, had significantly affected the terms of trade performance of developing countries
- 10 *Ibid*
- 11 T.N. Srinivasan, op.cit
- 12 Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Columbia, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire
- 13 For details on these aspects see Faizel Ismail (2007).
- 14 CUTS International (2006), "Strategic Review of WTO-provided TRTA Activities" Final Report submitted to Steering Committee of WTO on July 21, 2006. The report provides an in-depth critical analysis of the effectiveness and usefulness of TRTA activities and offers remedial measures to make the TRTA activities more responsive and helpful to the least developed and other developing countries.
- 15 Initially formed with some 23 members, the G-33 group has grown to about 45 members, as on July 2007.
- 16 The University of Warwick (2007) "The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?" The Report of the First Warwick Commission: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/report/uw_warcomm_tradereport_07.pdf

This Briefing Paper is written by N C Pahariya. Fellow, CUTS International