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# Like-minded Nations and Contrasting Diplomatic Styles: Australian and Canadian Approaches to Agricultural Trade\*

ANDREW FENTON COOPER *University of Waterloo*

The pairing of Australia and Canada has become a rich source of comparative studies with respect to strategies in terms of the International Political Economy (IPE). Keohane and Nye in their theoretically stimulating work, *Power and Interdependence*, chose Canadian-United States and Australian-United States relations as the case studies to illustrate some of their major themes concerning foreign economic policy behaviour in a post-hegemonic era.<sup>1</sup> In terms of substantive policy issues, the two countries have been the focus of attention for empirically detailed studies on a wide number of topics, including foreign aid, immigration, and international cultural diplomacy.<sup>2</sup>

This matching of Australia and Canada has been largely inspired by the like-mindedness of the two countries. Transplanted Anglo-democracies, sharing a common political/constitutional experience, with relatively small populations and an abundance of natural resources, the two countries have a number of common values and goals in terms of the

\* The author thanks Richard Higgott, Kin Richard Nossal, T. V. Worley, Bob Young and the anonymous referees of the JOURNAL for their comments. Support for this research was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

1 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), 165-218.

2 J. P. Schlegel, "Patterns of Diplomacy: Canada and Australia in the Third World," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 30 (1984), 7-18; Freda Hawkins, *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989); and Robert J. Williams, "International Cultural Programmes: Canada and Australia Compared," in Andrew Fenton Cooper, ed., *Canadian Culture: International Dimensions* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985). See also Annette Baker Fox, *The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

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Andrew Fenton Cooper, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1

international system. Most significantly, both remain strong advocates of multilateralism and a rules-based approach to international economic relations based on "general compromise and general compliance" rather than "lawlessness in which the prizes go to the powerful and the predatory."<sup>3</sup>

As Katzenstein points out, however, it is useful to distinguish between two components of strategy when discussing comparative approaches to the IPE.<sup>4</sup> If Australia and Canada may be said to have similar objectives with respect to the international system, the methods through which they have attempted to pursue these objectives have differed sharply. By failing to recognize this dichotomy, much of the literature on comparative Canadian and Australian approaches with respect to foreign economic policy has missed an important factor in explaining the differences between the diplomatic behaviour of the two countries.

In distinguishing between ends and means in foreign economic policy, it is important as well to locate Australia and Canada as quintessential middle powers. Middle-power behaviour presents an ambiguous conceptual category in international politics.<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, traditional middle powers such as Australia and Canada have tended to share the larger global "vision" of the post-1945 hegemon. On the other hand, nevertheless, it is apparent that these countries have retained a certain degree of diplomatic flexibility, or "opportunities for manoeuvre," vis-à-vis specific issue-areas in which they have sufficient resources or capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

Agricultural trade provides one interesting case study which highlights the applicability of using a dualistic mode of analysis when examining the foreign economic approaches of Australia and Canada. In terms of ends, a strong sense of similarity existed between Australia and Canada with regard to their strong support for the post-1945 agricultural/food order. Indeed, Australia and Canada may be described as first followers within this component of the international economic system. Followership, in this sense, means that these two countries not only "went along" in supporting the rules of that order but actively worked to

3 A. F. W. Plumptre, "Changes in the International Environment," *Canada's Approach to the Next Round of GATT Negotiations* (Toronto: Canadian Export Association, February 21, 1973), 3.

4 Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies," special issue, *International Organization* 31 (1977), 881-90.

5 See, for example, Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order," *International Journal* 44 (1989), 823-62. Cox suggests also that "the middle power role is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system" (825).

6 Annette Baker Fox, "The Range of Choice for Middle Powers: Australia and Canada Compared," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 26 (1980), 193.

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**Abstract.** The pairing of Australia and Canada has become a rich source of comparative studies with respect to foreign economic policy. This matching has been largely inspired by the like-mindedness of the two countries. Yet, if Australia and Canada may be said to have similar objectives in terms of the international system, the methods through which they have attempted to pursue these objectives have differed sharply. Using international-level and domestic-level modes of analysis, this article explains the reasons for the contrasting style in the case of agricultural trade. It is demonstrated that a number of mutually reinforcing factors combine to give a tough-minded quality to Australia's approach. In contrast, because of both a greater complexity in the domestic policy-making process and the range of foreign policy options, Canada's style in the agricultural trade issue has become increasingly nuanced.

**Résumé.** Les études comparant l'Australie et le Canada sont devenues une source riche d'enseignements sur la politique économique étrangère. Les similitudes entre les deux pays ont inspiré ces comparaisons. Ceal dit, bien que les deux pays aient des objectifs semblables dans le système international, leurs méthodes diffèrent nettement. En considérant tant le contexte internationale que les contextes nationaux, cet article expose les raisons qui expliquent ces styles différents dans le cas du commerce agricole. Une combinaison de facteurs ont conduit l'Australie à adopter une orientation plus radicale. Au contraire, le Canada adopte des positions de plus en plus flexibles en matière de commerce agricole, à la fois en raison de la complexité de sa politique intérieure et de l'éventail de ses orientations en politique étrangère.

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reinforce those rules. Still, though Australians and Canadians were like-minded in their view of what principles encompassed the "greater good," their agricultural trade diplomacies were most unlike in character. Most strikingly, there has been a marked divergence concerning the level of politicization accorded to this issue-area in the statecraft of the two countries. Canadian diplomatic efforts on agricultural trade have for the most part remained low-key and reactive in nature, with considerable attention given to cautious, constructive, mediator/bridge-building activities. In contrast, the Australians have taken a more high-profile, and at times confrontational, approach.

Through a focus on their differences as well as their similarities, it is hoped that a more balanced picture of Australian and Canadian foreign economic strategies will be provided. The approach taken in this article is a comparative/historical one, the aim being to present a broadly representative, episodic analysis rather than an exhaustive examination of Canadian and Australian behaviour with respect to the agricultural trade issue-area. The structure of the article is three-fold. After an overview of the general pattern of Canadian and Australian behaviour in the 1950s and 1960s, the factors influencing both change and continuity in this pattern will be scrutinized. Special attention will be given to the contrasting styles exhibited by Australia and Canada with respect to the Cairns Group, the group of so-called "fair trading" nations in which both of these countries have been prominent members. Finally, in the concluding section, an effort will be made to examine the reasons why Canada and Australia have differed so much in their diplomatic behaviour.

## First Followers: The Dynamics of Australian and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy in the Post-1945 Era

### 1. *Similarities in Approach*

The role of Australia and Canada in the post-1945 agricultural trade system has not been treated to careful examination in the wider IPE literature. Rather than being discussed as followers,<sup>7</sup> they have tended to be dismissed as secondary or subordinate states. If their roles have been discussed at all, these countries have been dismissed as free riders within a subsystem of the international economic order dominated by the United States.<sup>8</sup> The bulk of the research has concentrated on the leader distributing “international public goods.” Even those writers who have been critical of the changing nature of US behaviour within the agricultural/food regime have tended to look almost exclusively at the cause and effect of that behaviour, or alternatively at new challengers to US leadership.

Without question the United States was the predominant actor in the post-1945 global food order. By virtue of its willingness to perform the role of the global food manager, and specifically to take on the burden of being the stockholder of last resort in grains and other commodities, the US was instrumental in shaping the architecture of the system. The rules and norms of the system (which included adherence to the principles of the free market, the qualified acceptance of extra-market channels of food distribution, and low priority for national agricultural self-reliance) reflected above all American structural power.<sup>9</sup> Still, as valuable as this leader-centred analysis is in many ways, it distorts and devalues the role of the first followers. Rather than behaving merely as free riders on the back of the elephant, Australia and Canada often tried “to lead the elephant”<sup>10</sup>—as well as other more powerful actors in the international system. It may be argued that, far from being coerced (or socialized) into passivity, Australia and Canada adopted followership roles that were integral to the institutionalization and legitimization of the international agricultural trade order.

Central to this followership role was a form of burden-sharing within the agricultural trade system. One major focus of this activity was the stabilization of international commodity markets in which Australia

7 For general discussions of “followership” see Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, “Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (1991), 391-410; Richard Stubbs, “Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia,” *International Journal* 46 (1991), 649-67.

8 See, for example, Don Paarlberg, “On Sleeping with an Elephant,” J. S. McLean Memorial Lecture, University of Guelph, October 13, 1977.

9 Raymond Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala, eds., *The Global Political Economy of Food*, special issue, *International Organization* 32 (1978), 581-880.

10 Robert O. Keohane, “Big Influence of Small Allies,” *Foreign Policy* 2 (1971), 161.

and Canada were significant actors. Both countries, for example, worked hard to bring the International Grains Agreement (IGA) into effect in the late 1960s, and to ensure its survival in the face of the defection of both the leader (the US) and an aggressive challenger (France) from the pricing code. Much of this type of activity took the form of crisis-management diplomacy, involving shuttle diplomacy and the convening of emergency meetings. Australia and Canada also attempted to prop up the trading system by holding back on their own commercial practices. Canada's minister of industry, trade and commerce, Jean Luc Pepin, told the House of Commons that even if in the process of trying to save the IGA "we may have lost a number of sales . . . it was worth the effort."<sup>11</sup> Likewise, an Australian journalist wrote in regard to the situation: "International co-operation was only maintained by a virtual waiving of the price provisions and agreement by some exporters, such as Australia, to compete a little less aggressively so as to allow other nations to maintain their traditional share of the world market."<sup>12</sup>

A second focus of this form of followership was the extension of the benefits of the system to a larger circle of countries. This type of activity was directed to a large extent at ameliorating conditions in developing countries during crisis situations, such as the devastating Indian drought in the mid-1960s. It is important to note that, unlike US aid, Australian and Canadian relief was not tied to "good" international behaviour.<sup>13</sup> Australia and Canada, on selected occasions, also took on innovative responsibilities with respect to distributive internationalism.<sup>14</sup> Among the earliest Australian foreign policy initiatives were the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Colombo Plan. Canada's activities along these lines were even more diffuse. Not only did Canada play a leading role in the FAO and the Colombo Plan during the immediate post-Second World War period, but Prime Minister John Diefenbaker personally took on the task of constructing a global food bank in the late 1950s—the outgrowth of which was the successful UN/FAO World Food Program.

11 Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, July 21, 1969, 11398.

12 Tom Connors, *The Australian Wheat Industry: Its Economics and Politics* (Armidale: Gill, 1972), 121.

13 On this point see Michael B. Wallerstein, *Food for War—Food for Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), and Theodore Cohn, *The Politics of Food Aid: A Comparison of American and Canadian Policies* (Montreal: Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, January 1985).

14 See, for example, Escott Reid, *On Duty: A Canadian at the Making of the United Nations, 1945-1946* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1983), 11; John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957*, Vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976); Paul Hasluck, *Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs, 1941-1947* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980); and Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969).

A third focus of this form of followership was the diplomacy of restraint. Departures from the rules and norms by other actors were monitored and publicized. Particular attention was paid in this regard to those actors, most significantly the emergent European Community (EC), less wedded to the norms of the free market. Nevertheless, as suggested, this rules-keeping activity was not confined to what Lake has termed the potential "spoilers" of the system.<sup>15</sup> This aspect of Australian and Canadian diplomacy was directed as well at the system leader. Initially, the main target of this criticism was the American demand (and receipt) of a waiver from GATT obligations, allowing it to restrict the import of agricultural products under section 22 of the US *Agricultural Adjustment Act*. Later on, though, the focus of this criticism shifted onto the American practices of disposing of their surplus agricultural products through tied-sales, barter, straight gifts and the sale of goods for soft local currency, practices which were well beyond the "qualified" acceptance of extra-market channels for food distribution allowed under the agricultural trade system. The view that follower countries had an important role to play in restraining the activities of the dominant actor in the agricultural system, to ensure the continuity of the agricultural trading order, was expressed forcefully by long-serving Australian Minister of Trade Sir John McEwen: "I think it is right that we should argue vigorously and maintain pressures on the United States of America, directly and through international agencies, to see that that country, which frankly has been so vigorous and active in advising the world on the advantages of free trade, should itself to a maximum extent—practice a good deal of what it preached to the world."<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Differences in Style of Followership

Despite the fact that Australia and Canada worked in parallel fashion to maintain and strengthen the post-1945 agricultural trading order, the two countries differed markedly in terms of the form and intensity of their diplomatic techniques. This divergence in style is best captured by a matrix adopted, with some modifications, from the work of Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan.<sup>17</sup> This model, set out in Figure 1, is quite parsimonious. Yet the features it identifies, that is, approaches to problem-solving and relationship to other actors, provide a useful means of depicting the standard operating procedures of Australian and Canadian agricultural trade diplomacy. The principal difference with regard to

15 David A. Lake has divided non-hegemonic actors into "system supporters" and "spoilers" ("International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934," *World Politics* 35 [1983], 517-43).


16 Australia, House of Representatives, *Debates*, May 17, 1959, 1939.

17 J. Richardson, G. Gustafsson and A. G. Jordan, "The Concept of Policy Style," in J. Richardson, ed., *Policy Styles in Western Europe* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

problem-solving techniques is that, whereas Canadian diplomacy may be described as essentially reactive, the pattern of Australian diplomacy has been traditionally anticipatory and activist in nature. The contrast in terms of how the two countries deal with the leading agricultural trading nations is equally marked. Canada's relationship with the majors (and especially the US) has been for the most part highly consensus-oriented. Australia, by comparison, has taken a more aggressive approach. To use a popular analogy, Canada and Australia served respectively as the nice and tough cops in the agricultural trade system.

FIGURE 1

DIPLOMATIC STYLES IN THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE ISSUE-AREA



In mapping out these stylistic differences a number of features may be highlighted in terms of problem-solving techniques. Canada relied heavily on confidence-building measures. Crucial to this approach was the use of a wide variety of formal and informal forums to achieve rule compliance, an approach perfectly in keeping with Canada's traditional institution-building approach in international affairs. This pattern of quiet diplomacy was especially evident in the Canadian-US relationship, which featured a striking mix of constant consultation, transnationalism, and use of multiple points of contact indicative of the "special" ties which existed between them. On the issue of American surplus disposal practices, for example, Canadian complaints were discussed at the bilateral level (the Joint Canada-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs and the North American Committee of the Food and Agriculture Organization), as well as at the multilateral level (the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, the Investment Bankers Association, and GATT meetings).<sup>18</sup> Canada sought interna-

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Theodore H. Cohn, *The International Politics of Agricultural Trade: Canadian-American Relations in a Global Agricultural Context* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990), 58-63.



tional rulings in concert with other nations rather than on a "go-it-alone" basis.

A similar, albeit far less complex, pattern may be discerned in terms of Canadian diplomacy with respect to other key actors in agricultural trade. Quiet diplomacy was the hallmark of Canada's negotiations with the EC throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than directly confronting the EC with reference to restrictions on free access of agricultural products into the West European market, Canada preferred to build up trust and credibility and alleviate misunderstanding and misperception through a long-term, collective, dispute resolution effort. Multilaterally, Canada played an important role in a variety of early attempts to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Bilaterally, and in marked contrast to Australian diplomacy, Canada pushed hard for a Contractual Agreement with the EC.

Despite its disapproval of many of the practices of other actors in the agricultural system, Canada declined to take (or even to threaten to take) retaliatory action against the offending parties. Canadian policy-makers believed such action would be counter-productive to the future of the system, fearing that it would reinforce unilateralism to the detriment of global stability. A striking example of this disinclination to "get tough" with the US was Canada's refusal to impose sanctions on the US in response to the GATT waiver, even though several smaller countries did so. In a similar manner, Canada refrained from punishing the EC for restricting market access. Rather, Canadian diplomacy concentrated on attempts to gain entry through positive inducements, in the way of strategic commitment and investment opportunities.

Australian agricultural diplomacy featured a more confrontational style. Australia was far more willing than Canada directly to take on the "Greats" with respect to agricultural trade. This combative approach was apparent in the Australian struggle against American surplus disposal in the 1950s and 1960s. Australian declaratory statements on this issue went much further than those of the Canadians, labelling US actions as hypocritical and unfair. Moreover, rather than modifying its attempts to open up the EC market in the mid-1970s, Australia intensified these efforts. Using what was described as "over-zealous," "wild buffalo," "bushranger," or "bull in the china shop" diplomacy,<sup>19</sup> this diplomatic campaign featured: "frontal assaults, blunt criticism . . . in public speeches and statements, [and] uncompromising negotiation."<sup>20</sup>

19 John McIlwraith, "EEC Baffled by Aust's 'Wild Buffalo' Diplomacy," *Australian Financial Review*, May 31, 1978, 2; Greg Hywood, "Australia: A Burr under the Saddle of the EEC," *Australian Financial Review*, November 24, 1981, 12; Stuart Stimson, "How the 'Mafia' Was Blunted," *Business Review Week*, November 27-December 3, 1982, 21.

20 Alan Burnett, *Australia and the European Communities in the 1980s*, Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 12 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1983),

In marked contrast also to the Canadian approach, Australian diplomacy has historically been marked by its impatience. Rather than building up long-term associational links, Australian diplomacy has tended to rely on quick fixes associated with personal tours of the prime minister or leading ministers. This desire to "do something" quickly was particularly evident in the late 1970s and 1980s when agricultural trade matters were dominated by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade Doug Anthony, and Special Trade Negotiator Victor Garland. When questioned, for instance, on why the government did not concentrate more on a longer-term strategy designed to build up alliances with groups within the EC which were critical of the CAP, Garland replied: "We know there are forces within the Community working against the excesses of the Common Agricultural Policy. But we cannot rely on them to bite deeply or quickly. We must act firmly and decisively now."<sup>21</sup>

This aggressive style was, somewhat paradoxically, reinforced by the development within Australia of a more ambivalent attitude towards international institutions. As noted above, Australia had long been a keen supporter of the idea of both the UN and international commodity arrangements. Yet, Australia displayed increased frustration concerning the capacity of multilateral institutions to act as effective mechanisms for regulating agricultural trade in practice. This attitude led in turn to periodic episodes in which Australia turned its back on those same institutions. During the 1950s the Menzies-McEwen government contemplated not continuing their GATT tariff concessions because of the US waiver. In a similar vein, in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting, a sense of pessimism concerning the effectiveness of multilateral solutions spread among Australian policy-makers.<sup>22</sup>

Australia was more willing than Canada to extend its public diplomacy by linking agricultural and non-agricultural issues in order to maintain pressure on the majors. Although eager to express its solidarity with the US in the defence of the overall rules of the agricultural trade order, Australia was willing also to raise the stakes in instances where the US did not act in accordance with its leadership role. On specific occasions, most notably in 1964 when Prime Minister Robert Menzies threatened to cut off American imports of tobacco, airplanes and tractors to Australia if more restrictive meat import legislation was passed in the US, the threat of some form of economic retaliation was proposed. Underlying this type of threat, however, was a moral argument. "I

125, 221. See also Peter Bowers, "Fraser: A Hard Run in Europe," *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 17, 1978, 10.

21 Australia, House of Representatives, *Debates*, March 16, 1978, Garland, 833.

22 See, for example, Vincent W. Stove, "Australians Lose Faith in GATT," *Journal of Commerce*, December 2, 1982, 1A.

cannot see," Menzies wrote to President Lyndon Johnson, "how the United States could exert effective leadership and expect success in her effort to contain and reduce restrictions on agricultural trade if she herself imposed restrictive action against imports of beef."<sup>23</sup>

A more coercive variation of linkage diplomacy served as the central component of Australia's assault on the CAP. Whereas Canada hoped to modify the EC's behaviour through rewards, Australia preferred to establish a tit-for-tat form of retaliatory diplomacy. Initially, Australia attempted to play its resources card; Australia told the EC in no uncertain terms that if restrictions on agricultural imports were not eased, European access to cheap and secure Australian supplies of uranium and other energy resources would be jeopardized. When this trade lever proved ineffective, Australia then attempted to use its own buying power as a means of influencing the EC. Specifically, it threatened to redirect its purchases of a wide variety of items away from Western Europe. Targeted in this fashion were foodstuffs and beverages, automobiles, electronics and communication equipment, transport equipment (such as the Airbus) and defence equipment (the Mirage 2000).<sup>24</sup>

### Adjusting to Change in the 1980s and 1990s

This article cannot, and need not, join the broad-ranging contemporary debate over post-hegemonic change in the IPE, other than as the necessary context for locating this study of comparative Australian and Canadian agricultural diplomacy.<sup>25</sup> In this regard a few points merit attention. The first has been the shift from hegemony to multipolarity in the international economic order. Although the US remains a powerful actor in the IPE, its position has declined in relative terms vis-à-vis second-tier actors. Second, the global trading system established in the post-1945 era has come under increasing pressure from the growth of economic nationalism and strategic trade. Third, the main causalities of

23 "Australia Warns U.S. on Beef Curb," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1964. See also Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 206.

24 See, for example, "Boiling Over Down Under," *The Economist*, June 17, 1976, 63-64, and "Aust EEC Access Demand," *Australian Financial Review*, April 23, 1980, 1.

25 For a selection of competing interpretations see inter alia: Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert W. Cox, *Power, Production and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill and David Law, *Global Political Economy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony," *International Organization* 39 (1985), 207-31; Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization* 41 (1987), 551-74, and W. Russell-Mead, "The United States and the World Economy," *World Policy Journal* 6 (1988), 1-47.

these changes in the international economic order have been the principles and norms which underpinned that order.

The confusion and conflict found in international agricultural trade relations reflect, indeed exemplify, many of the general trends found in the IPE. The most dynamic change in this issue-area has been the ascendant position of the EC. In the 1970s and early 1980s, stimulated by the food "shocks" of the early 1970s, the EC moved from being a net importer of agricultural goods to a position where its production exceeded self-sufficiency in a wide range of goods. The result was a gradual globalization of the CAP, as the surpluses generated internally were exported outside of the EC through a generous "restitution" system. In overall commercial transactions the US continued to lead, selling \$US41.7 billion worth of produce in 1982, 70 per cent more than in 1976; however the EC surged into second place, its agricultural exports being valued at \$27 billion in 1982, a 156 per cent rise during the same six-year period.<sup>26</sup> In terms of specific commodities, the EC had, by the early 1980s, become the world's largest exporter of some major agricultural exports, including poultry; the supplier of 60 per cent of the international market in butter and dried milk; and the second largest exporter of beef (after Australia) as well as a major exporter of grain and flour.<sup>27</sup>

The impact of this challenge to American leadership was felt in a variety of ways. At the level of values, there continued to be fundamental differences between the US concern for more liberal approaches to trade and the EC's heightened emphasis on "sovereignty" and the "management" of international transactions. At the level of action, the EC's increasingly bold export approach prompted counter-measures from the US. During the Carter administration and the early years of the Reagan administration, this response centred on a concerted attempt to win recourse through a revamped subsidy code of international trade under the GATT. Dissatisfaction with the slow pace involved in changing the formal rules governing export subsidies (symbolized by the failure of the November 1982 GATT ministerial meeting to achieve agreement) resulted in a shift towards "fighting fire with fire" through the introduction of the Export Enhancement Program (EEP).<sup>28</sup> By this change from residual multilateralism towards a more explicit form of unilateralism, the US signalled to its followers as well as to the challeng-

26 Figures taken from Paul Lewis, "Europe's Farm Policies Clash with American Export Goals," *The New York Times*, February 22, 1983, 1, 5.

27 D. Gale Johnson, Kenzo Hemmi and Pierre Lardinois, *Agricultural Policy and Trade: Adjusting Domestic Programs in an International Framework*, A Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1985), 25, 109.

28 See, for example, Robert Paarlberg, *Fixing Farm Trade: Options for the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 91-97.

ers in the agricultural trade issue-area that its own interests came ahead of the defence of the liberal international trading order.<sup>29</sup>

The erosion of the post-1945 global agricultural system and the new fragmentation in the global relations of agricultural trade were extremely traumatic events for Australia and Canada. Economically, these countries found themselves caught in the crossfire of the escalating "ploughshares war" between the US and the EC.<sup>30</sup> Diplomatically, the change in the rules of the game revealed just how vulnerable had become the position of the traditional first followers of the post-1945 system. This vulnerability was visible more immediately in the case of Australia because of its decidedly outsider status in agricultural trade negotiations. Indeed, it became increasingly clear that the vocal diplomatic style adopted by Australia was counter-productive in the new international context. As one commentator put it bluntly: "The risk is playing the white knight role when we have not got the opportunity to succeed."<sup>31</sup> Canada's own vulnerability was cushioned somewhat by both its comparatively high international status and its varied institutional links with the US and the EC. Yet, even with this set of advantages, Canada found it increasingly hard to counter the unilateral behaviour of the majors and establish a re-ordered set of rules in the trading system. Various Canadian attempts to work out a new international grains arrangement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, achieved little in the face of resistance by the US and the EC.<sup>32</sup>

This trauma stimulated the serious process of re-evaluation which characterized Australian diplomacy in the early 1980s. Discarding much of the sound and fury (or, as one former senior Australian diplomat termed it, "talk, bluster and international exhibitionism"<sup>33</sup>) of its traditional diplomatic style, the Hawke government endeavoured to substitute a more thoughtful and logical approach. One major change was a much greater emphasis on research with particular attention focussed on the production and dissemination of economic information regarding

29 US "mismanagement" of the international economy has been highlighted by, inter alia, Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, 345, and Susan Strange, "The Future of the American Empire," *Journal of International Affairs* 42 (1988), 12-14. One American observer has gone so far as to describe the US as the bully boy of world trade (see William Niskanen, "The Bully of World Trade," *Orbis* 33 [1989], 531-38).

30 Nicholas Butler, "The Ploughshares War Between Europe and America," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (1983), 105-22. See also Oliver Bertin, "Canadian Farmers Face Heavy Losses in World Trade War," *Globe and Mail*, July 3, 1986, B1, and Kenneth Randall, "Caught in the Cross-Current," *Business Review Weekly* (Australia), July 19, 1985, 15-22.

31 Stuart Stimson, "The GATT Fiasco Bodes Ill for Australia," *Business Review Weekly*, December 4-10, 1982, 37.

32 Oliver Bertin, "Argue Pushes for New Wheat Trade Pact," *Globe and Mail*, December 28, 1981.

33 Alan Renouf, *The Frightened Country* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979), 497.

global trends in agricultural trade. The best known of these studies was the investigation by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) of the EC's agricultural policy, which provided extensive data on the external and internal costs accruing from this system.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to this technical activity, Australia also embarked on an ambitious exercise in what may be called coalitional diplomacy,<sup>35</sup> culminating in the formation of the Cairns Group of agricultural trading nations. This effort was intended both to consolidate a sense of mutual interest on agricultural issues with like-minded countries and to build new associative ties with agricultural exporting countries in the developing world. The most important of the countries in the former category was Canada. Although much of Australia's and Canada's followership in the post-1945 agricultural trade order had been conducted in parallel rather than in tandem fashion, co-operative efforts for a "joint defence" against the unilateralist activity of the majors intensified in the early 1980s.<sup>36</sup> It is worth noting in this context that moves in this direction were buttressed by the close relationship established between prime ministers Bob Hawke and Brian Mulroney during this period. Hawke, for example, was an observer at Mulroney's January 1985 economic summit in Ottawa, which brought together representatives of a wide variety of groups to discuss policy choices.

With regard to the latter category of countries, the Hawke government could capitalize on an accumulated store of good will from the developing countries for championing the cause of small countries in the past. Despite its parochial attitudes on a wide range of issues (including industrial protection and immigration) in the 1950s and 1960s, Australia had been in the forefront of diplomatic efforts to introduce more equity within the international system. The strength of this reformist approach may be illustrated by reference to McEwen's proposal at the 1958 Commonwealth trade and economic conference for a worldwide agreement on commodities designed to stabilize prices. A similar tendency marked Australia's formal application in 1965 for an exemption under the GATT to accord some degree of preferential treatment with respect to import duties from a selected number of developing countries. This process of forging a more harmonious connection between Australia and

34 Bureau of Agricultural Economics, *Agricultural Policies in the European Community: Their Origins, Nature and Effects on Production and Trade*, Policy Monograph No. 2 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), 32. Sarah Sargent, "EC's Policy Cost Frs \$5 Billion: Report," *Australian Financial Review*, September 31, 1985, 5; and *Agra Europe*, September 20, 1985, P/1.

35 For a fuller discussion of this coalitional diplomacy, see Richard A. Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations," *International Organization* 44 (1990), 589-632.

36 See, for example, "Joint Defence in Wheat Trade Planned," *The Australian*, April 6, 1983, 7.

the developing world was consolidated in the 1970s. The Gough Whitlam government developed new forms of contact with the developing countries through organizations such as the Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries, the International Bauxite Association, and UNCTAD. The Fraser government vigorously supported the G-77 efforts to bring "fair and stable" prices to world commodity markets by way of the establishment of a new series of international commodity agreements under the aegis of the common fund.

In acting as the driving force for global reform in agricultural trade, Australia displayed the adaptive nature of middle-power followers in the international system. Faced with a void of positive leadership, these followers took on elements of this leadership role in specific issue areas. This is not to say that Australia attempted to lead on agricultural trade in the same way that the US had done in the post-1945 period—on the basis of structural power. Rather, the Australian approach was based on what Oran Young has termed entrepreneurial and technical leadership.<sup>37</sup>

This emergent form of leadership was clearly evident in the Cairns Group initiative. First of all, Australia acted as the catalyst for launching this group. The declaratory statements (on the theme that it was "time to call a halt to this ridiculous world trade war" and "subsidy madness") by Prime Minister Hawke and other Australian policy-makers served as a rallying call to other actors for collective action; and the Australian government did most of the preparatory work for the creation and development of the Group. Australia planned and convened a ministerial-level meeting of 14 of the most important smaller agricultural trading nations at Cairns, in Queensland, during August 1986. Australia also led in formulating the Cairns Declaration which voiced the negotiating demands of the group in the context of the multilateral trade negotiations.

Australia also devoted a great deal of time and resources to managing the coalition. Central to this task of institution-building was the establishment of some division of labour, the development of monitoring activity, and the establishment of a loose co-ordinating mechanism to maintain internal cohesion and international clout of the group. As Minister of Trade John Dawkins, who acted as the initial chairman of the group, informed the House of Representatives in October 1986: "My Department will provide the necessary secretariat to facilitate continued cooperation and liaison both within its membership and in its dealings with the major trading economies."<sup>38</sup>

A crucial component of this managerial activity was the activity of a small group of public officials. Indeed, a smaller close-knit cadre of

37 See Oran O. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization* 45 (1991), 281-308.

38 Australia, House of Representatives, *Debates*, October 10, 1986.

administrators, including Geoff Miller (the Secretary of the Department of Primary Industry); Peter Field (Department of Foreign Affairs); Andy Stoeckel (BAE); and Alan Oxley (Australia's ambassador to GATT), had considerable influence on the process of coalitional diplomacy. Oxley's role was particularly significant. In order to maintain momentum, Oxley chaired the group's work programme in Geneva which, in the process of attempting to get agreement among the heterogeneous membership, monitored individual country approaches and attempted to draft joint proposals.<sup>39</sup>

By this new emphasis on institutionalization and confidence-building, Australia took on, in the 1980s and 1990s, some of the characteristics of the traditional Canadian diplomatic style. Notwithstanding this adaptation, though, it is important to underline the sense of continuity as well as adaptation in Australian diplomacy. If more skillful and constructive in terms of entrepreneurial and technical leadership, the Australian diplomatic approach remained as highly politicized as it had been in the past. Single-mindedly, Australian policy-makers committed themselves to get results.

The high intensity of Australian agricultural diplomacy came out in a variety of ways. For one thing, the Australians continued to rely heavily on forms of public diplomacy. Most notably, the Cairns meeting was designed to serve as a public relations event—attracting as much domestic and international attention as possible. Prime Minister Hawke's opening address featured an emotional call for a "united attack" against the US and the EC agricultural policies. The press conference at the meeting was a sizeable affair, attended by an array of Australian ministers and officials. And, in an arrangement designed to add another element of political theatre to the event, the EC and the US representatives (attending the meeting as observers) were given prominent seating positions—an arrangement likened by the head of the EC delegation to being in the "dock" in a court case.

The desire by the Australians to maintain the pressure of trade reform meant that they constantly pushed the Cairns Group forward in policy terms. During the Cairns meeting Australian attention was focussed on getting agreement on a much stronger declaration on agricultural subsidies than the draft Swiss-Colombian document drawn up in the pre-negotiation stage of the Uruguay Round. Instead of a careful wording of this so-called "Café au Lait" document, which called for a phased reduction of agricultural subsidies "within an agreed time-frame," the Australians pressed hard for an explicit statement condemning subsidies

39 William Dullforce, "How Australia Operates in GATT," *Financial Times* (London), December 7, 1988, 7. Oxley had been labelled as an old Labor party "stooge" when his appointment was made (Australia, House of Representatives, *Debates*, April 29, 1986). For an illuminating portrait of this diplomatic activity see Alan Oxley, *The Challenge of Free Trade* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).



on principle. Subsequently, in search of an “early harvest,” Australia was instrumental in formulating a more detailed, step-by-step approach to the GATT negotiations. The crux of this approach, first put forward in a proposal by Australia at the Bariloche meeting of the Cairns Group in February 1988, called for a freeze on all farm subsidies and new import barriers to commence in 1989 as part of a “downpayment” or “advance” on a longer-term agreement on agriculture. At a meeting of trade ministers in Islamabad, Pakistan, in October 1988, Australia, on behalf of the Cairns Group, called for a reduction of import barriers and agricultural price supports by 10 per cent for two years. By July 1989, in what was expected to be the lead-up to the final stage of the negotiations, Australia was calling for complete elimination of quantitative restrictions as part of a longer-term reform package.<sup>40</sup>

To show its good faith on trade reform, Australia expressed a new willingness to embark on an accelerated process of internal adjustment. Rejecting protectionism at home as well as abroad, the Hawke government committed itself to expose more fully the Australian economy to the forces of the international market place. A significant manifestation of this shift in attitude came in Prime Minister Hawke’s October 1987 speech to the contracting parties of the GATT at Geneva, in which he promised that Australia was prepared to eliminate all of its restrictive barriers as part of a radical step towards trade liberalization. Intellectual support for this internal reform drive was provided in 1989 by a number of well-publicized studies, including the Garnaut Report, the Hughes Report on Australian export performance and the Pappas, Carter, Evans and Koop report prepared for the Australian Manufacturing Council.<sup>41</sup> These studies reached similar conclusions about the necessity for internal adjustment in the Australian economy, and helped push the Australian public policy agenda towards a neo-liberal agenda centred on deregulation and competitiveness.

In contrast to Australia’s ambitious exercise in entrepreneurial and technical leadership in agricultural trade, Canada’s approach to the Cairns Group was more ambivalent and nuanced. While willing to “go along” with the initiative both because of Canada’s commitment to multi-lateralism and its sense of victimization with respect to the export subsidy

40 Cairns Group, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Long-term Reform of Agricultural Trade,” released in Canada as News Release No. 292, Minister for International Trade, Ottawa, July 13, 1989.

41 Ross Garnaut, *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy* (Canberra: AGPS, 1989); Helen Hughes, *Australian Export Performance, Obstacles and Issues of Assistance: Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance* (Canberra: AGPS, 1989); Pappas, Carter, Evans and Koop, *The Global Challenge, Australian Manufacturing in the 1990s: What Part Will Manufacturing Play in Australia’s Future?* (Melbourne: Australian Manufacturing Council, Interim Report, 1989).

practices of the majors, Canada displayed a weaker degree of followership in this form of coalition diplomacy than it had in the US-led post-1945 international order. At odds with the pattern of middle-power behaviour in the 1950s and 1960s, Canada was content to “tag along behind Australia”<sup>42</sup> in building and maintaining the Cairns Group. Indeed, there seemed to be considerable hesitation on the part of Canada in getting too deeply committed to the proposals and programmes of the coalition. Canada was not a participant in the drafting committee of Australia, Argentina and Thailand which drew up the text of the declaration issued at the Cairns meeting. Nor, despite its long experience with this form of diplomacy, did Canada play a mediating role inside the Group. Most notably it was Australia, not Canada, which made the effort to ensure that Brazil—the main potential defector—remained in communication with the rest of the members of the Group.<sup>43</sup>

Canada’s comparative lack of enthusiasm for this ambitious coalition-building exercise also comes out clearly in its low level of ministerial representation. The Canadian representative at the Cairns meeting was Charles Mayer, minister of state for the Canadian Wheat Board—a relatively junior cabinet minister. Immediately afterwards, the Canadian delegations to the Cairns Group meetings were led by the junior minister of state for finance, Tom Hockin. Only when the Cairns Group showed its staying power was the task of representation allocated to the minister of international trade within the Department of External Affairs, first Pat Carney and then John Crosbie.

Even more seriously from the standpoint of followership, Canada showed a considerable reluctance to subordinate its own interests to those of the coalition. Far from being an enthusiastic advocate of common initiatives, Canada developed the reputation within the group for its restrained—and autonomous—behaviour. This divergent approach was apparent in Canada’s defence of the Swiss-Colombian text, despite the Australian objections that this text was too qualified and non-committal. The Canadian representative argued that, because of its support by 48 countries, the Swiss-Colombia document constituted the best basis for agreement on “complementary steps to de-escalate the current level of subsidization” in agriculture. This cautious and detached stance was evident as well in the Canadian scepticism concerning the proposal that the principle of “special and differential” treatment for the developing countries should be explicitly incorporated into the policy statements of the Cairns Group. While Australia was willing to embrace this lofty concept primarily for the sake of Group unity, Canada considered it unwise to concede the principle too early in the negotiations because this would encourage an extremely wide array of countries to claim this

42 Maldwyn Jones, “Farm Subsidy Crisis,” *Financial Post*, March 23, 1987, 13-14.

43 Oxley, *The Challenge of Free Trade*, 112.

right. Finally, Canada was far less willing than Australia to agree to the broadening of the Cairns Group's agenda (especially with regard to linking agricultural reform to movement on such issues as services and intellectual property) in order to maintain the negotiating pressure.

The Canadian preference was to use the Cairns Group as a tactical rather than a strategic tool. By signing on to the Group Canada hoped to embellish its wider multilateral diplomacy in regard to the GATT negotiations, not to mesh its own approach on agricultural policy to that of its coalition partners. Certainly it did not expect that the Cairns Group could be transformed into a viable third force in the negotiating process. In keeping with this stance, the Canadian leadership role with respect to the Cairns Group was largely restricted to acting as the Group's voice in forums to which Australia and the other members of the Group did not belong. In this sense at least, there was a form of reciprocity in Canada's contribution to the Group. On the one hand, Canada's membership in the Group was crucial because of its ability to get the agricultural trade issue prominently placed on the agenda at the 1987 Venice Summit and the 1988 Toronto Summit of the G-7 group.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, Canada received enhanced prestige because of this form of diplomatic effort.

The transformation of the Cairns Group from a loose assembly of "fair-trading" nations fighting exporting subsidies to a common front, therefore, posed serious problems in terms of Australian-Canadian relations. From the Australian standpoint, Canada was increasingly viewed as a country having a place in, but not sharing the approach of the Group—a view buttressed by Canada's willingness to increase the level of subsidization for its domestic grain and oilseeds industry and to entertain bilateralism in the form of a Free Trade Agreement with the US. From the Canadian standpoint, the ambitious nature of the Australian proposals and the wide definition of a freeze on farm subsidies signified an unwarranted intrusion into the sphere of domestic agricultural policy. If Australia was the motor of the group, Canada was the brake.

An open rift between Canada and Australia originally appeared in 1988 about how the proposed freeze was to be implemented. Although the subject of a great deal of crisis-management diplomacy, the differences remained so fundamental that Canada refused to sign the submission of the Cairns Group to a GATT agricultural committee meeting in July 1988.

44 See, for example, John Kohut, "Agricultural Group Backs Canadian Bid to Seek Freer Trade at Venice Summit," *Globe and Mail*, May 23, 1987, B6, and Leo Ryan, "Canada Targets Farm Trade War as Top Priority," *Journal of Commerce*, May 26, 1987, 24. Even in terms of G-7 summitry, though, the Australian presence was felt. Prime Minister Hawke was in the United States at the same time as the Toronto Summit was taking place. He used the opportunity to phone Prime Minister Mulroney, and to give a speech on the agricultural trade issue in Chicago (see *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 19, 1988, 4).

Canada, while willing to agree to a freeze on further trade-distorting programmes and while prepared to accept an overall reduction of 10 per cent over the next two years, remained adamantly opposed to any commodity-specific measures.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, far from waning, the gap in the negotiating stances of the two countries widened as the GATT negotiations shifted from subsidies to market access. While Australia was willing to put everything it had on the table, Canada remained defensive about its own agricultural structures—which it considered to be non-trade distorting. In particular, Canada wanted due allowance under Article XI for import quotas in support of supply management programmes.

### **Explaining the Differences**

If Australia and Canada are like-minded countries in regard to their overall perspectives on agricultural trade, especially in terms of their shared belief in the need for well-established rules of the game and international co-operation, they offer sharp contrasts with respect to their diplomatic styles. Although the form of Australian diplomacy has been modified considerably in terms of form, scope and associative patterns in the 1980s and 1990s, many of the more traditional characteristics of Australian agricultural trade diplomacy have remained in place as well. In comparison to Canadian behaviour, the distinguishing features of Australian diplomacy have remained single-mindedness of purpose, impatience with the slow progress of the negotiating process, and a propensity for risk-taking in its diplomatic efforts. If Australia has pushed hardest for reform, it has also expressed its willingness to raise the stakes as far as possible to get results.

The distinctive style of Australian agricultural diplomacy is accentuated by its contrast to the Canadian approach. Whereas Australian agricultural trade diplomacy, despite all its recently acquired innovativeness, has retained an aggressively determined quality, Canadian diplomacy has become increasingly muted and constrained in orientation. The bulk of the proposals for agricultural reform discussed within the Cairns Group faced serious resistance from Canada. Far from supplying intellectual and organizational leadership, or even true followership, within the Cairns Group, Canada took a safety-first approach with respect to the coalition.

In looking for explanations as to why these stylistic differences have become so firmly embedded in Australian and Canadian diplo-

45 Compare Government of Australia, "Illustrative Elements of Commitments to Reduce Support as Part of First Steps to Long-Term Reform," No. MTN, ENG/NES/W/70/Rev. 1, GATT, July 13, 1988, and Government of Canada, "Proposal by Canada Regarding the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Agriculture," No. MTN. ENG/NEE/NE5/W/19, GATT, October 20, 1987, 1.

macy, Keohane's suggestion that an "international-level analysis . . . is a precondition for effective analysis" seems apt. That is to say, a preliminary examination of the international context in which Australian and Canadian agricultural trade approaches are located helps "establish a context for the comparison and evaluation of national policies."<sup>46</sup> From this perspective, a number of determinants needs to be considered. The first of these relates to the psychological or cognitive dimension of the position of Australia and Canada in the international political economy. This dimension encompasses the "undercurrents, of mood, tone, or milieu, of a climate of feeling that almost imperceptibly insinuates itself into concrete ideas and actions."<sup>47</sup> These influences are by their very nature subjective and impressionistic. Nevertheless they do seem to take on considerable importance with respect to any examination of Australian and Canadian foreign policy. The second factor relates to the actual structural attributes of Australia and Canada within the IPE, that is, the production and trade profiles of the two countries. This type of analysis, with special reference to the agricultural sector, offers a means of more objectively assessing the foreign economic interests of Australia and Canada. The third, and final, determinant which needs to be looked at relates to the situational context of Australian and Canadian agricultural trade diplomacy. The question which must be asked in this regard is whether the range of choice open to Australia and Canada in terms of foreign economic policy influences their diplomatic style.

In psychological terms, the perceptions of Australia and Canada concerning their respective positions in the IPE differ considerably. The dominant feature of Australia's view of the global economy has been one of uncertainty and distrust. The external world has long been considered a hostile environment for Australia.<sup>48</sup> More specifically, Australia has retained a deep-seated suspicion about the willingness and capacity of the majors to allow Australia to have a "fair go" in the international trading arena. Despite the hope held out by Australia that its "great and powerful friends" would protect Australian interests in the economic as well as the security sphere, these expectations were repeatedly shattered. The entry of the United Kingdom into the European Community in 1973—and the subsequent closure of the EC market to Australian agricultural goods—constitutes the most serious act of betrayal from the

46 Robert O. Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Capitalism," in J. H. Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1984), 16.

47 Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy* (New York: Knopf, 1983), xiii.

48 This theme of insecurity dominates the Australian foreign policy literature. See especially Bruce Grant, *The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), chap. 1; and T. B. Millar, *Australia in Peace and War* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), chap. 30.

Australian perspective.<sup>49</sup> This sense of distrust, however, remained a strong and persistent theme in Australian public diplomacy, coming to the fore once more during the trade crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Because of its willingness to counter the EC's actions by unilateral means, the US was condemned for "playing by rich countries' rules," continuing to preach "the concepts of freedom of markets—and then to repudiate them."<sup>50</sup> This sense of resentment at these US actions was so strong that Australia allowed the agricultural trade issue to spill over not only into non-agricultural issues but also into strategic/defence issues. At the declaratory level, there were suggestions that the joint defence facilities that the US operated in Australia (at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and the North West Cape) could be jeopardized if there were no move by the Americans to de-escalate their illiberal trade practices.<sup>51</sup> At an operational level, the focus of interest centred on the application of linkage politics with respect to the US in a more indirect fashion, namely the relationship between the agricultural trade issue and the economic capability of Australia to maintain its regional strategic/economic responsibilities.<sup>52</sup>

Canada, conversely, has displayed a greater sense of confidence about its ability to deal with changes in the international trade arena. Rather than responding bitterly to the UK's joining the EC, Canada was relatively quiescent about the British move, notwithstanding a brief outburst of anger by the Diefenbaker government. Even with the CAP in place, Canada continued to have high expectations throughout the 1970s vis-à-vis its trading prospects with the Community.<sup>53</sup> In a similar fashion, while extremely concerned about the nationalist tenor of US foreign economic policy in the 1980s, Canada believed the situation could be managed by effective diplomacy.<sup>54</sup> Canada's strategy remained that of

49 Australian diplomacy regarding the entry of Britain into the EC is covered well by Harry G. Gelber, *Australia, Britain and the EEC: 1961 to 1963* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1966), and J. D. B. Miller, *EEC and Australia* (West Melbourne: Nelson, 1976).

50 Peter Samuel, "Hawke Flays US Hypocrites Over Cheap Wheat for Russia," *The Australian*, August 1, 1986, 1.

51 See, for example, Peter Logue, "Beazley to Warn US on Wheat Policies," *The Australian*, August 11, 1986, 1, and Anne Summer, "Hayden Put US Alliance on the Line over Trade," *Australian Financial Review*, August 14, 1986, 1.

52 "Australia Declines to Join War Games with United States," *The New York Times*, August 19, 1986, A13. For a fuller discussion on these forms of linkage, see Richard A. Higgott, *The Evolving World Economy: Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1989).

53 For a good discussion of the Canadian diplomacy regarding the EC, see J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), chap. 6. On the overall Canadian response to the British move into the Community see James Eayrs, "'Calm Benignity' to UK's Euromart Bid," *Toronto Daily Star*, July 14, 1971.

54 See, for example, Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Playing by New Rules: Allan Gotlieb,

relying on new institutional arrangements to mitigate irritants. To a considerable extent, this more optimistic attitude may be viewed as a direct consequence of Canada's status as a member and key player in a number of influential bodies within the international economic arena. While Australia remained a frustrated outsider, Canada was a privileged insider. Not only did Canada have a more successful record of having its personnel selected for positions in well-established organizations such as the GATT (for example, Dana Wilgress served as the GATT's first executive director and Allan MacEachen served as chair of the GATT ministerial conference in 1982), but Canada, unlike Australia, had been granted entry into a number of exclusive bodies such as the G-7, G-10 and the Quadilaterals (meetings of the trade representatives from the US, the EC, Japan and Canada). In addition, Canada does not have the regional/strategic responsibilities taken on by Australia. Leaning on the US for continental defence, Canada has enjoyed the benefits of alliance membership with little more than a token commitment to NATO. As such, there was little incentive for Canada to link economic and non-economic issues.<sup>55</sup>

As shown in Table 1, this disparity in psychological conditions was reinforced by the contrast in the structural conditions of the two countries. If the adoption of a tough diplomatic posture offered Australia a form of compensation for its sense of insecurity in the world, it also reflected its highly idiosyncratic economic profile. Australia has a highly efficient export-oriented form of agricultural production, encompassing a broad range of tropical and temperate products including sugar, rice, grains and meat. This resource diversity, however, far from enhancing economic security, appears to increase Australia's susceptibility to diminished access to its goods in an illiberal trading environment. Nor is this problem of exposure to the vagaries of the IPE in Australia alleviated by trends towards economic diversification. Notwithstanding the shift towards industrialization since 1950, secondary manufacturing still accounts for a minority share of Australian exports. Seventy per cent of Australia's exports are still derived from natural resources with rural items (including wool) contributing half of this sub-total. Combined, these factors make any "made at home" solution to agricultural trade problems (by way of either subsidies or a general relief package) extremely difficult to contemplate. Despite enormous pressure from the rural community for an immediate solution, the Hawke government remained firmly fixed in the belief that Australia lacked the capability to "throw money" at the problem.<sup>56</sup>

Public Diplomacy, and the Management of Canada-US Relations," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 14 (1990), 93-109.

55 See, for example, Jeff Sallot, "With Friends Like These," *Globe and Mail*, November 21, 1987, D2.

56 For a discussion of Australian agricultural trade policy as a two-level game, see

TABLE 1

## THE STRUCTURE OF AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN TRADE

	Australia		Canada
GNP per capita in US\$ 1989		14,360	19,030
GDP (millions of dollars)	1965	23,700	46,570
	1989	281,940	488,590
Percentage of merchandise exported			
Fuels, minerals and metals	1965	13	28
	1989	32	19
Other primary commodities	1965	73	35
	1989	35	19
Machinery and transport	1965	5	15
	1989	5	39
Other manufactured exports	1965	10	22
	1989	27	24

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report 1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 205, 209, 235.

Canada presents quite a different picture. As evident from Table 2, Canada has a far more limited profile in terms of its outward-oriented agriculture, with its exports restricted largely to grains, oilseeds and red meat produced in the West. The bulk of agricultural production in the East, including the dairy, poultry and fruit and vegetable industries, has remained internally-oriented, import-sensitive and regulated through instruments of supply management. At the same time, notwithstanding its deficiencies in terms of research and development and export diversification, Canada, by Australian standards, has a well developed base in manufacturing and service industries. With a greater range of economic interests, Canada has not chosen to pursue an agri-centric foreign economic strategy in the same fashion as Australia. Although agriculture remains important for Canada, with farm products contributing only 7 per cent to Canada's total exports it is not *the* pivotal issue that it is for Australia. The aim of Canada's GATT diplomacy has thus been to get a balanced result across a wide range of agenda items in the interest of the

Andrew Fenton Cooper, "Australia: Domestic Political Management and International Trade Reform," in Grace Skogstad and Andrew Fenton Cooper, eds., *Agricultural Trade: Domestic Pressures and International Tensions* (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990), 111-33.



economy as a whole, not one which put progress on agricultural trade before any other goal.<sup>57</sup>

TABLE 2

AUSTRALIA AND CANADA: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WORLD TRADE IN SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES (with global ranking shown in parentheses)

	Australia	Canada
Barley		14.5 (4)
Cereals and preparations	3.4 (10)	3.8 (7)
Meat (chilled and frozen)	7.9 (4)	4.1 (11)
Oilseeds		5.7 (4)
Rice	3.0 (6)	
Sugar and honey	4.9 (4)	
Wheat	13.5 (3)	21.6 (2)
Wool	37.8 (1)	

Source: United Nations, *UN International Trade Statistics*, Vols. 1 and 2 (New York: United Nations, 1988).

The situational contexts in which Australia and Canada conduct their agricultural trade diplomacy also diverge considerably. As emphasized throughout this study, Australia and Canada are like-minded countries in the sense that both have traditionally favoured multilateralism as their first option in the international trade arena. Yet, in terms of their alternative approaches, it may be suggested that the two countries are most unlike. This discrepancy reflects the importance in the IPE of location, or, put another way, of the reality that "where a state sits determines where it stands."<sup>58</sup> Canada, through the FTA and possibly an emergent North American FTA, has a viable (if still extremely contentious) bilateral/regional option in place if the international trading system becomes increasingly fragmented along geographical lines. If, from a diplomatic perspective, a strong argument may be made that this form of adjustment further reduces Canada's manoeuvrability, both in terms of pushing Canadian diplomacy to be more placatory to the US and pulling it away from traditional "go-between" roles,

57 See, for example, Frank Stone, *Canada, the GATT and the International Trade System* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984), and Jock Finlayson and Ann Weston, *The GATT, Middle Powers and the Uruguay Round* (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, June 1990).

58 Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 1-2 (1990), 77-96.

this fallback approach does offer some form of comfort in a re-aligning IPE. Certainly, for export-oriented agricultural industries as for other competitive Canadian industries, the prospect of securing enhanced access in the huge US market (where over 70 per cent of Canadian exports is directed) is particularly attractive.

The alternative courses of action available to Australia are of a very different nature. As is evident from Table 3, since the ending of the preferential trading arrangements with the UK Australia has traded in a diversified set of export markets. This is not to suggest that Australia does not have potential bilateral/regional options. But the exercising of these options remains questionable. In similar fashion to the Canada-US trade initiative, the possibility of the creation of an extended Australia-US bilateral free-trade agreement was raised in ministerial discussions between US Special Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter and Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Bill Hayden in Canberra in January 1988. Yet, subsequent to detailed study by a Ministerial Task Force on Long-Term Economic Growth (the Snape Report), the idea was rejected, not only because of the distance between the two countries but because of the considerable disparity between the sizes of their economies.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, the only option available to Australia has been the symbolically important, but economically limited, Closer Economic Relationship (CER) with New Zealand.

TABLE 3

TRADE BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES (value as percentage of world trade in 1989)

	Australia	Canada
United States	11.2	74.2
Japan	27.7	6.3
United Kingdom	3.5	2.6
Germany	2.7	1.4
France	2.2	1.0
Korea	5.5	1.2
China	2.7	0.8

Source: United Nations, *UN International Trade Statistics*, Vol. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1991).

59 R. H. Snape, "Should Australia Seek a Trade Agreement with the United States?" Discussion Paper 86/01 (Canberra: Economic Planning Advisory Council and Department of Trade), 1986. See also Vincent W. Stove, "Australia Cool to Trade Deal," *Journal of Commerce*, February 26, 1988, 8A.

The pursuit of the regional option is a more attractive, albeit more complex, endeavour for Australia. The prospect of Australia, perceived externally and internally as a "wanderer"<sup>60</sup> in international affairs, moving from a position where it was "in" the Asia-Pacific region to a position where it is "of" the region has received abundant attention. Aside from their geographical proximity, there are important complementarities between the economies of Australia and the Asia-Pacific countries, not the least of these being the potential for Australian agricultural exports to grow substantially in that dynamic growth area. Notwithstanding Australia's role in the governmental and non-governmental efforts to develop an institutional framework to facilitate Asian-Pacific co-operation, the barriers to this integrative process are formidable. In addition to the constraints on the development of two-way interaction attributable to the legacies of Australian industrial protectionism and the "White Australia" immigration policy, there are the immense practical barriers of forging new links with countries with "dozens of different cultural, economic, and governmental systems."<sup>61</sup>

Set against this background, the Hawke initiative of 1989-1990 on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) may be seen in its proper perspective.<sup>62</sup> As distinct from Canada, regionalism rather than bilateralism has been the second-best approach for Australia. As far back as 1970, a major report on Australia's relations with the Third World suggested that some form of Asia-Pacific grouping would offer the second best option for Australia in the event of a collapse of the GATT and the strengthening of "blocism."<sup>63</sup> Prime Minister Hawke himself, shortly after assuming office in 1983, launched a prototype of this sort of campaign designed to obtain greater co-operation in trade between Australia and the Asia-Pacific Countries.<sup>64</sup> However, the significance of the APEC initiative, set out in a speech by Hawke in South Korea in January 1989 and culminating in the APEC forum held in Canberra later in November, should not be exaggerated. Despite suspicions that this thrust signalled a declining commitment to the GATT, the

60 Sir Alan Watt, quoted in Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 72.

61 "Australia in the Asia-Pacific Region," address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, to the World Affairs Council and Asia Society, October 7, 1988, *AFAR*, October 1988, 406. See also Paul Addison, "Asia-Pacific Warily Greets Trade Proposal," *The Japan Economic Journal*, April 15, 1989, 2.

62 For a more general discussion of APEC, see Richard A. Higgott, Andrew Fenton Cooper and Jenelle Bonnor, "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: An Evolving Case-Study in Leadership and Cooperation Building," *International Journal* 45 (1990), 823-66.

63 Owen Harries, *Australia's Relations with the Third World* (Canberra: AGPS, 1979).

64 See, for example, John Durie, "Hawke Campaigning for Pacific Region Trade Talk," *Australian Financial Review*, December 8, 1983, 21. See also Stuart Stimson, "Australia Hedges Its Bets with Pacific Push," *Business Review Weekly*, November 27-December 3, 1982,

APEC agenda as it emerged was entirely consistent with multi-lateralism, centring on the establishment of a Pacific OECD and/or a system of most-favoured-nation trade concessions for member countries so as to reduce regional trade barriers. Nor, in practice, was this grouping exclusionary. Although the core membership of APEC, as originally defined by Australia, left out the United States and Canada, the North American countries were invited to the Canberra forum. Rather than compromising Australia's best option, therefore, the regional option supplemented Australia's GATT-centred trade diplomacy.

The external context for the comparison and evaluation of Australian and Canadian agricultural trade diplomacy having been established, the next step, as Keohane suggests, needs to be an analysis of certain key variables in the domestic structure. Two factors, above all, seem crucial. The first relates to the divergent political cultures in the two countries. Australian norms have usually been portrayed as adversarial, based on "a rough house . . . larrikin tradition" of politics.<sup>65</sup> Canadian norms, by contrast, have tended to be characterized as those of "patience and compromise."<sup>66</sup> While one has to be careful in presenting such a stark juxtaposition, given the possibility of crude national stereotyping (a "nation of battlers" versus a "nation of compromisers"), these norms do seem to have some policy relevance. Boardman, for one, in a useful recent study of Australian environmental politics and policy, supports such a perspective. In detailing the key differences between Australian and Canadian policy-making in this issue area, he states "Australian political culture appears to elevate the values of political combativeness and to disparage mere consensus-seeking of the Canadian variety."<sup>67</sup>

The second factor concerns the differentiated degree of state capability and the nature of state/societal relations in Australia and Canada.<sup>68</sup> Australia and Canada, with respect to the general concept of "strong" and "weak" states,<sup>69</sup> appear to be at different ends of the continuum.

65 Maximilian Walsh, *Poor Little Rich Country* (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1979), 89.

66 The classic formulation of this view is found in Thomas Hockin, "Federalist Style in Internationalist Politics," in Stephen Clarkson, ed., *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 119-30. See also Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," this JOURNAL 15 (1982), 667-90.

67 Robert Boardman, *Global Regimes and Nation-States: Environmental Issues in Australian Politics* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990), 202.

68 For a careful examination, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s," *International Organization* 40 (1986), 105-37.

69 See especially Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), and John Zysman, *Governments, Markets and Growth* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

The impression one gets of Australian foreign economic diplomacy throughout the post-1945 era is that of concentration in terms of decision-making, with a relatively narrow core of elite policy-makers (ministers and officials) in control of the agenda. Interest groups, for sure, have had some considerable degree of influence in this process, but this influence has been structured through a neo-corporatist institutional mechanism. Implicit in the 1950s and 1960s, in the form of McEwenite "syndicalism,"<sup>70</sup> this aspect of Australian politics with respect to societal access has been made explicit in the 1980s, through the establishment of the Accord, and the Economic Planning Advisory Council (EPAC) under the Labor party.

This corporatist orientation comes out clearly in the agricultural trade issue. At the national level, Australia's agricultural diplomacy has been shaped by a number of bodies concerned with the formation of Australia's overall trade strategy, such as the Trade Development Council, the Trade Negotiation Advisory Group and the Commodities Trade Advisory Group.<sup>71</sup> At the sectoral level, a concerted effort was made by the government to bring the National Farmers' Federation (NFF) onside with the Cairns initiative and other aspects of the government's foreign economic policy. The NFF, effectively structured and legitimized as the representative body vis-à-vis the rural interest in Australia, has accordingly been gradually drawn into a new pattern of consultation and joint activity encompassing data collection, the inclusion of Federation representatives on all major diplomatic missions abroad, and negotiations on the future agricultural agenda.

The capacity of the Canadian state to develop a consistent strategy in the agricultural trade issue-area has been far more constrained. Because the Canadian state is far more variegated in its organizational features, Canada has not been able to speak with one consistent voice on agricultural trade. Bureaucratically, rather than displaying the unity of approach exhibited in Australia, the policy-making process in Canada has been marked by intense disagreement and competition between departments, not only on "turf" but on substantive matters. For External Affairs and other reform-oriented forces the main question has been that of how fast to liberalize. For Agriculture Canada and other resisters, in contrast, the concern has been how to lessen the impact of the process of adjustment. Hierarchically, and in contrast to the Australian situation where the states have had little impact on agricultural policy-making, the federal fact in Canada has been highly salient. Indeed, the

70 J. D. B. Miller, *Australia's Economic Relations* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1975), 8-9.

71 Richard A. Higgott, "International Constraints on Labor's Economic Policy," in Brian Galligan and Gwyn Singleton, eds., *How Labor Governs: The Hawke Government and Business* (Melbourne: Longmans, 1991).

policy-making process in Canada has been dominated by the need to work out lowest denominator approaches acceptable to the provinces.

To a considerable extent this constrained position of the Canadian state reflects the extent of the divisions and fragmentation at the societal level along commodity and regional lines. Moreover, instead of there being a trend towards a more pronounced sense of unity within the agricultural community as is evident among the Australian groups, the pattern has been the reverse—towards even greater internal differentiation and nesting within specific geographical and production groupings.<sup>72</sup> To a considerable extent, this contrasting behaviour can be explained by reference to the fact that Australian producers en masse had been forced, in the 1970s and 1980s, to rationalize and become more competitive in international markets. Canadian farmers, or at least those with an inward-looking focus, have been somewhat more removed from this process. At the same time, the shift towards enhanced agricultural units in Australia reflected a more dynamic form of farm leadership than in Canada. Whereas the NFF has served as an effective peak organization, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture has been increasingly unable to act as an effective umbrella organization.

In this vacuum, the forces of responsiveness and resistance to change within the agricultural sector have struggled to influence the agenda on the basis of their own needs and interests. At one end of the spectrum, the more export-oriented commodity organizations enthusiastically embraced the concepts of efficiency and adjustment. These reform-oriented groups include the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, the United Grain Growers, the Western Wheat Growers' Association and the Prairie hog marketing boards. At the other end of the spectrum, the groups representing producers in the more inward-looking, domestic-oriented and regulated forms of agriculture remained wary of change, fearing their livelihood and way of life would be sacrificed on the altar of rationality. This anti-reform element embraces such diverse groups as the National Farmers' Union, national and provincial marketing boards and the Quebec Union des Producteurs Agricoles (UPA). Intensifying this split were the reinforcing or accumulative tendencies inherent in the regional/commodity divide. In other words, a dominating feature in Canadian agricultural politics is what Skogstad has termed the "provincial-producer alliance" in Canada.<sup>73</sup> Supporting the reform-oriented agricultural groups have been the

72 Barry K. Wilson, *Farming the System: How Politics and Farmers Shape Agricultural Policy* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), 142-48. See also William D. Coleman, *Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 101. See also Grace Skogstad, "The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Trade Policy: The Impact of Institutions," this JOURNAL 25 (1992), 319-47.

73 Grace Skogstad, "Canada: Conflicting Domestic Interests in the MTN," in Skogstad

western provincial governments, led by Alberta. Conversely, the forces of resistance have been strongly backed by provincial governments in Ontario and Quebec. The UPA, most notably, was able to get the Quebec government's full support in its defensive campaign vis-à-vis both the GATT and the FTA.

The Mulroney government initially attempted to manage these domestic tensions through a defensive transactional approach. One component of this approach was the initiation of an extensive process of consultation through formal means (including a Federal-Provincial Agricultural Trade Policy Committee, the Committee on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and a Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade) and informal means. Another component was the implementation of side-deals with both adjusters and resisters. In the short run, this accommodative approach may be considered to have been quite successful. By putting off clear-cut choices between the export-oriented and import-sensitive groups, rather than addressing the controversial issues head on, the Conservatives were able to retain strong political support in two of the strongest pillars of their 1984 victory—the rural vote in the West and Quebec—at the 1988 election. Inevitably though, in the longer run, the approach proved problematic from both a foreign policy and a domestic political perspective. An ambiguous policy, with an emphasis on the lowest common denominator, not only gradually eroded Canada's credibility in the Cairns Group, but had the effect of more fully internalizing foreign economic policy-making, so that every diplomatic move was carefully scrutinized by adjusters and resisters as a test of the government's good will.

## Conclusions

This work attempts to examine how like-minded countries have exhibited quite distinctive approaches in terms of foreign economic policy. Although Australia and Canada may be viewed as first followers of the post-1945 period, this followership has been expressed through different forms of diplomacy. This divergence is most clearly apparent with reference to diplomatic style, based on the criteria of problem-solving and relations with major actors. As demonstrated by its diplomacy with respect to the Cairns Group, Australian diplomacy has become more sophisticated and creative. Yet, even with this shift, the dominant style of Australian trade diplomacy has remained fundamentally different

and Cooper, eds., *Agricultural Trade*, 48. See also Grace Skogstad, "The Farm Policy Community and Public Policy in Ontario and Quebec," in William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, eds., *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach* (Mississauga: Copp Clark, 1990), and Skogstad, "The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Trade Policy."

from Canada's. The reasons for this difference are multi-dimensional, taking into account a mix of exogenous and internal factors. The various factors in Australia's case, however, are mutually reinforcing. Australia's historical sense of grievance and isolation, its continuing sense of vulnerability in terms of the IPE, and its limited international options, together with an adversarial political culture, its "strong" state structure and high degree of societal mobilization, all combine to shape and condition a tough-minded quality to Australian agricultural trade diplomacy.

The Canadian agricultural trade approach, by contrast, has become increasingly nuanced in style. In declaratory statements, Canada has retained a strong commitment to multilateral trade reform. Operationally, though, Canada's cautious and consensus-oriented diplomacy in this issue-area has become more pronounced. Constrained by its dualistic agricultural structure and its diffuse governmental apparatus and with the availability of alternative bilateral and (to the extent at least of having greater financial resources for internal safety nets and ad hoc assistance schemes) unilateral options in terms of the IPE, the central concern for Canadian agricultural trade diplomacy has been the search for some form of balance between its internationalist obligations, the interests of its polarized domestic agricultural interests, and the need to manage its "special relationship" with the US. Greater complexity in the policy-making process has, therefore, translated into a more ambivalent diplomatic style.

The wider methodological concerns emerging from this comparative study pertain to whether these conclusions are issue-specific. That is to say, are the divergent national styles found to exist between Australia and Canada in terms of agricultural trade diplomacy due largely to the unique characteristics of this issue-area? Or, conversely, do these national differences carry over to other issue-areas?<sup>74</sup> Case studies that may be illuminating in this regard are those which concentrate on other foreign economic issue-areas which do not have the emotive quality attached to that of agricultural trade. Conducting more research of this nature will ascertain whether agriculture presents a special case in terms of Australian and Canadian economic diplomacy, or whether these two countries have indeed distinctive national styles that extend across issue-areas. As such, this research will be able to make an important contribution to comparative foreign economic policy analysis.

74 See Gary P. Freeman, "National Styles and Policy Sectors: Explaining Structured Variation," *Journal of Public Policy* 5 (1985), 467-96.



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